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Using comparable data sets for five African countries, we evaluate possible explanations 
for the employer-size wage effect across these countries. Our results indicate that, apart from 
observable worker characteristics, most theories cannot explain very much of the wage 
premium received in larger firms. Moreover, we find that the employer-size wage effect 
does not differ greatly across the five African countries. As is the case with other developing 
nations, however, the effect is larger than that found in the industrialised world, though 
unlike the industrialised world it is larger for white collar workers than for blue collar 
workers. Data for one of the African countries, in conjunction with other evidence, suggest 
that this may in part be the result of skill-biased technology having a greater effect on the 
firm’s size-wage distribution across skill groups in developing countries. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The fact that larger firms appear to pay higher wages than smaller firms for equally 
productive workers was noted as early as Moore (1911). However, despite a re- 
emergence of interest in this aspect of the labour market in the late 1980s,
1 the 
availability of richer data sets, and the use of more sophisticated statistical techniques, 
there has been little consensus on the cause of this empirical observation.
2 This 
phenomenon is also not confined solely to the developed world. Recently a number of 
studies have confirmed the existence of what is often termed the firm-size wage effect in 
 
* We are grateful to the CSAE for provision of the data. In particular we would like to thank Francis Teal 
for his help and advice on numerous matters regarding the data. Thanks are also due to Holger Goerg for 
comments and Eric Fishbein for research assistance. 
1 See Brown and Medoff (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989). 
2 For a recent review of the literature see Oi and Idson (1999). 
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a number of developing nations as well; see, for example, Little et al. (1987), Schaffner 
(1998), Mazumdar and Mazaheri (1999), Velenchik (1997), and Marcelle and Strobl 
(2003). Moreover, the wage premium associated with working in larger firms appears to 
be larger in developing countries than in developed countries, a feature that also remains 
as of yet unexplained. (Biggs and Srivastava (1966, p. 33)) 
Unearthing the causes of the employer-size wage effect in developing countries is 
important for a number of reasons. First, because labour markets in developing countries 
differ in many respects from those in the developed world, exploring the firm-size wage 
premium in these countries can provide further pieces to the puzzle. Secondly, the 
employer-size wage effect is likely to add to income inequality, which already tends to 
be high in developing countries. While clearly the understanding of and reduction in 
income inequality is a complex issue, if the firm-size wage effect is large, its role in 
policy formulation cannot be ignored. In particular, development agencies and policy 
makers often view small firms as alternative employers for surplus labour and as a 
means to achieve more productive employment and more equitable distribution of the 
benefits of growth (Biggs et al. (1998)). 
In this paper we use the Regional Programme for Enterprise Development (RPED) 
database to investigate the firm-size wage effect for five African countries: Cameroon, 
Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Using this particular data set has a number of 
advantages. While most theoretical explanations for the employer-size wage effect stress 
the matching of employers and employees as the driving force, studies have traditionally 
used either worker or workplace data independently. Only in the last few years have 
researchers gained access to employer-employee matched data that have allowed them to 
evaluate these theoretical explanations more accurately. (See, for instance, Reilly (1995) 
and Trotske (1999)) The RPED data set is unique in that it is one of the only 
employer-employee matched data sets for developing countries and, hence, is ideally 
suited for our purposes. Specifically, the RPED data set provides comparable data for 
the countries that it covers.   
Our paper is not the first to use the RPED data to examine the firm-size wage effect 
in Africa. Previously, Velenchik (1997) explored a large number of explanations for the 
wage premium for employees of large firms using the Zimbabwe data and found that a 
sizeable portion of the premium remained unexplained. Mazumdar and Mazaheri (1999) 
examined the impact of labour productivity on the firm-size wage effect for Ghana, 
Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe using a somewhat different approach than what has 
become the norm in the literature, namely by simultaneously estimating wage and labour 
productivity determination equations under the assumption that the capital-labour ratio 
does not affect an individual’s wage directly. Although they found that more of the 
employer-size wage effect could be explained with their approach in terms of economies 
of scale and capital intensity effects, a large portion still remained unaccounted for. 
The current paper adds to the existing literature in a number of ways. First of all, 
ours is one of the few studies for developing countries that can address a large variety of 
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employee matched data set.
3  Moreover, because of the comparability of the data across 
the five countries in our analysis, we are able to explicitly focus on cross-country 
comparisons of the firm-size wage effect, thus providing a further dimension with which 
to evaluate the validity of the many proposed explanations. This latter aspect is 
particularly important in that previous studies, both for developing and developed 
countries, that have addressed international comparisons have all been somewhat limited 
by the lack of strict comparability of data sets. The RPED was specifically designed and 
collected to circumvent such problems.
4 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section (Section 2) we briefly describe 
our data set and present summary statistics relevant to examining the firm-size wage 
effect. We then (in Sections 3 and 4) systematically address and test for alternative 
explanations of the firm-size wage premium in our five African countries. In Section 5 
we compare our results with those found for other developing and developed nations and 
provide concluding remarks in the last section. 
 
 
2.    THE RPED DATA SET
5  AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
The data used in this study are drawn from three years (1991-93) of the RPED 
survey for Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These data are part of a 
cross-country panel employer-employee matched data set compiled by the RPED at the 
World Bank. In each of the five countries, approximately 200 enterprises were surveyed 
across four sectors - food processing, wood and furniture, textiles, and metalworking - 
with these sectors comprising about eighty percent of manufacturing employment. 
Additionally, within each firm approximately ten workers were individually interviewed. 
The firms were selected on the basis of size in order to generate a sample representative 
of the complete size distribution of firms in the manufacturing sectors of these countries, 
whereas the workers were selected in a random fashion. Apart from the matched 
information on firms and employees, the fact that the data were collected in all five 
countries at about the same time and with more or less identical questionnaires makes 
the data particularly well-suited for cross-country comparisons. 
The data constituting the variables used in this study were generously made available 
to the authors by the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford. In 
addition, we used more detailed data available for Ghana, also made publicly available 
by CSAE. Definitions of all variables used are given in the Appendix. For the purposes 
of this paper, we excluded all data derived from firms with any state ownership and all 
 
3  Even for developed countries most studies in the past have not had access to employer-employee 
matched data. Exceptions include Reilly (1995) and Trotske (1999). 
4 See, for instance, Schaffner (1998), Marcelle and Strobl (2003), and Albaek et al. (1998). 
5 The data description is mostly take from Biggs et al. (1998). ERIC STROBL AND ROBERT THORNTON  140
data on apprentices. It should also be noted that, as in most previous studies, our 
measure of the wage rate and worker characteristics is at the worker level and, given the 
employer-employee matched nature of our data, that we supplement this worker level 




Table 1.    Summary Characteristics - All Firms
1 
 Cameroon Ghana  Kenya  Zambia  Zimbabwe 
Size (mean)  112  52  97  80  350 
Size (st. dev.)  395  80  247  181  671 
Hourly Wage (mean)  3.66  0.89  4.81  1.85  4.31 
Hourly Wage (st. dev.) 1.91  0.55 2.36  1.36  1.73 
FAge 10  14  18  N/A  25 
Union (% Firms)  38.0  31.9  47.5  43.3  78.9 
Union (% Emp.)  28.1  69.9  34.6  34.8  49.6 
Foreign 31.8  19.7  16.5  13  25.6 
K/L 26,884  7,786  19,021  17,070  23,446 
% Skill  51.2  15.0  88.7  81.2  73.9 
% Univ.  15.4  1.5  10.7  10.0  8.9 
% Sec.  55.8  24.5  59.1  52.1  41.9 
% Sec. Man.  50.7  16.3  39.7  42.4  34.3 
% Univ. Man.  19.5  3.4  4.5  8.2  4.4 
% Supvis.  26.1  7.5  64.5  58.5  54.2 
Note: 




In Table 1 we have calculated some summary statistics concerning our sample of 
firms for each country. Among the more important characteristics to note are that firms 
6 Another point regarding the use of the data for the analysis of the firm-size wage premium is noteworthy. 
Given the employer-employee nature of our data, one could argue that in all our econometric specifications 
we should control for both worker- and firm-level fixed effects. There are a number of reasons why we do not 
do this. Firstly, with regard to worker-level fixed effects, while the RPED data allow one to link firms over 
time, workers are neither given a code that would allow them to be traced across interviews nor are they 
specifically chosen so as to be re-interviewed. With regard to firm-level fixed effects, there is not enough 
time variation in firm size or in our other firm level explanatory variables across the (maximum of) three 
annual observations per firm to allow for this. For example, over 95 per cent of the variation in firm size is 
due to the variance across firms; therefore purging a firm fixed effect from any estimation would be purging 
the very thing we are trying to explain. Regardless of these limitations, one should note that the set of firm 
and worker level explanatory variables is arguably rich enough to account for almost any potentially biases 
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in Zimbabwe are on average substantially larger in terms of numbers of workers than in 
the other African countries while those in Ghana are smaller. We also find that the mean 
hourly wage rate, converted to $US at purchasing power parity, varies considerably 
across the manufacturing sectors of the five countries. For instance, Ghana is 
characterized by the lowest average hourly wage rate, with firms in Kenya having an 
average hourly wage rate more than five times that in Ghana. It is clear from these 
averages that the countries with the largest average firm-sizes do not necessarily also 
have the highest average wage rates. Table 1 also reveals that there are significant 
differences across the countries with respect to other firm characteristics such as 
unionization, capital intensity, and the distribution of skill levels. 
 
 
3.    THE BASIC EMPLOYER-SIZE WAGE PREMIUM 
 
We have already noted that from the firm level averages there appears to be no 
strong relationship between employment size and the hourly wage rate across countries. 
Of course, as the standard deviations show (see Table 1 again), there is considerable 
variation within countries. Hence we plotted for each country the average wage rate in 
each firm against its size for each country (with all values in logged terms). As we found, 
there clearly exists a positive relationship between the average hourly wage rate and the 
size of a firm. Moreover, in all five countries this relationship appears to be reasonably 
linear, although the slopes differ somewhat. 
In order to estimate the employer-size wage relationship and derive the most 
rudimentary employer-size wage premium, we first simply regressed the logged values 
of the hourly wage rate on the logged values of firm employment for the given sample of 
workers for each country, controlling only for year-specific effects with time dummies. 
The resulting coefficients of this exercise are given in the summary Table 2 (line 1).
7 As 
can be seen, the hourly wage rate of workers is positively and significantly related to 
employer size in all five countries, with the coefficients roughly of the same magnitude. 
Of course, to assess the impact of the employer-size wage effect on the actual wage 
distribution one must take into account differences in the size distribution of firms across 
countries. Following Brown and Medoff (1989), we define the magnitude of the 
employer-size wage premium as twice the product of the coefficient of log employment 
and the standard deviation of log employment (within each country). Our estimate can 
then simply be interpreted as the percentage wage premium received by employees in a 
firm whose size is one standard deviation above the mean log employment relative to the 
wage premium received by employees in firms one standard deviation below the mean 
log employment. The derived wage premiums corresponding to the estimated 
coefficients for the previous regression and for all following regressions are reported in 
 
7 More detailed results of these and all other regressions are available from the authors. ERIC STROBL AND ROBERT THORNTON  142
Table 3. As can be seen in line 1 of Table 3, clearly differences in the size distribution 
matter in terms of assessing the premium across countries. Using our definition we find 




Table 2.    Summary Table: Employer-Size Wage Effects
1 (Regression Coefficients)
2 
 Sample  Controls
3 Cameroon Ghana Kenya Zambia  Zimbabwe 
(1) All  workers  None  0.277  0.250 0.185 0.243  0.234 
(2) All  workers  F  0.234  0.215 0.157 0.197  0.203 
(3) All  workers  F,W  0.098  0.114 0.090 0.096  0.138 
(4) All  workers  F,W,K  0.099  0.109 0.088 0.096  0.125 
(5) All  workers  F,W,S  0.100  0.105 0.095 0.098  0.136 
(6) All  workers  F,W,P    0.101  0.100 0.092 0.085  0.137 
(7) All  workers  F,W,A  0.102  0.130 0.089 N/A  0.126 
(8) All  workers  F,W,U  0.099  0.084 0.095 0.093  0.142 
(9) Non-Man.  F,W,E  0.079  0.068 0.087 0.088  0.125 
(10) Non-Man.  F,W   0.084 0.111 0.087 0.089 0.119 
(11) Non-Man.  F,W,M  0.087 0.111 0.093 0.118 0.111 
(12) All  workers  F,W,  
all other signif. controls
0.097 0.116 0.088 0.081 0.127 
(13) White  Collar F,W  0.117  0.162 0.095 0.122  0.247 
(14) Blue  Collar  F,W  0.072  0.086 0.083 0.074  0.098 
Notes: 
1 All regressions include year dummies. 
2 All coefficients are statistically significant at least at the five 
percent level. 
3 Control Variables: W - worker characteristics; F - firm characteristics; S - skill level of firm; 
K - capital/labour ratio; P - firm profit; A - firm age; U - firm level union density; E - educational level of 
managers; M - percentage of managers. 
 
 
Table 3.    Summary Table: Magnitudes of Employer-Size Wage Premiums
1 
 Sample  Controls
2 Cameroon Ghana Kenya Zambia  Zimbabwe 
(1)  All  workers None  66.8  57.3 57.1 63.8  72.3 
(2)  All  workers F  56.5  49.2 48.4 51.7  62.7 
(3)  All  workers F,W  23.6  26.1 27.8 25.2  42.6 
(4)  All  workers F,W,S  24.1  24.0 29.3 25.7  42.0 
(5)  All  workers F,W,K  23.9  25.0 27.1 25.2  38.6 
(6)  All  workers F,W,P    24.4  22.9 28.4 22.3  42.3 
(7) All  workers  F,W,A  24.6  29.8  27.5  N/A  38.9 
(8)  All  workers F,W,U  23.9  19.2 29.3 24.4  43.9 
(9)  Non-Man.  F,W,E  19.1  15.6 26.8 23.1  38.6 
(10) Non-Man.  F,W  20.3  25.4 26.8 23.4  36.8 
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Table 3.  (Continued) 
 Sample  Controls
2 Cameroon Ghana Kenya Zambia  Zimbabwe 
(11) Non-Man.  F,W,M  21.0  25.4 28.7 31.0  34.3 
(12) All  workers  F,W,  
all other signif. controls
23.4  26.6 27.1 21.3  39.2 
(13) White  Collar  F,W  28.2  37.1 29.3 32.0  76.3 
(14) Blue  Collar  F,W  17.4  19.7 25.6 19.4  30.3 
Notes: 
1 Calculated as twice the product of the coefficient of log firm-size and the standard deviation of log 
employment. The standard errors of log employment were 1.20653, 1.145184, 1.542234, 1.313117, and 
1.544475 for Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, respectively.   
2 Control Variables: W - worker characteristics; F - firm characteristics; S - skill level of firm; K - 
capital/labour ratio; P - firm profit; A - firm age; U - firm level union density; E - educational level of 
managers; M - percentage of managers. 
 
 
4.    POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EMPLOYER-SIZE WAGE 
PREMIUM - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
We have thus far shown that on average large employers pay higher wages in all five 
of our African countries. However, worker and firm characteristics may differ across 
firm size, and these differences must be controlled for. Moreover, there are a number of 
theories that seek to explain why large employers tend to pay more. In order to evaluate 
these theories further, we estimate below the following model of wage determination: 
 
i i i i i X Z E w µ λ β α + ∂ + + + = ln l n                                       ( 1 )  
 
where   is the logged value of the worker’s hourly wage rate (in PPP $US),   
is the (logged) employment size of the firm in which the individual is employed,   is 
a vector of firm-specific characteristics,   is a vector of worker-specific observable 
characteristics, and    is a worker-specific error term. The approach that we will use is 
one that is standard in the literature: namely, we systematically add various control 
variables to Equation (1) to evaluate various potential explanations for the employer-size 
wage premium. The control variables that we use to evaluate these potential 
explanations are the following: 





•  Various firm characteristics (e.g. foreign ownership, location, industry group); 
•  Observed worker characteristics (gender, tenure, age, education, occupation); 
•  Capital-labour ratios; 
•  Average worker skill levels; 
•  Sharing of monopoly profits; 
•  Age of firm; ERIC STROBL AND ROBERT THORNTON  144
•  Union avoidance; 
•  Manager skill levels; 
•  Efficiency wages; 
•  The desire to reduce worker turnover; 
•  The desire to avoid paying worker benefits. 
 
In the remainder of this section, we discuss each of the control variables and the extent 





Clearly there are many factors affecting the wage rates that individuals receive. For 
example, in their classic study Krueger and Summers (1988) show that there are 
differences across industries. Also, it has been shown that foreign firms tend to pay 
higher wages than domestic firms, probably due to the formers’ greater use of 
technology. (See for instance Aitken et al. (1996)). Furthermore, if labour markets are at 
least to some degree regional, then the location of a firm may be an important 
determinant of wages, in part due to differences in labour market tightness and 
differences in the cost of living. If these factors are unevenly distributed across firm-size, 
then they may provide some explanation as to why larger firms pay higher wages. 
Indeed our data set allows us to identify whether firms are foreign-owned, whether 
they are located in the country’s capital city, and in which broad industry group within 
manufacturing they belong (e.g., textiles). According to raw correlations of these and 
other variables with firm size, we find that larger firms are more likely to be 
foreign-owned. Furthermore, in all countries except Kenya larger firms are more likely 
to be located in the capital city, although the correlation coefficients here are fairly low. 
From these correlations it is also apparent that the sectoral locations of firms by size are 
not necessarily similar across countries. The results of including these firm 
characteristics as explanatory variables in Equation (1) are given in our summary Table 
2 (line 2). Not surprisingly, we find that foreign firms and firms located in the capital 
city pay higher wages in all five countries. Additionally, the significance of at least some 
of the industry dummies in all countries is in line with what has been found in the 
literature on inter-industry differentials. Most importantly, though, while the coefficient 
on firm size is reduced for all five countries, the magnitude of the reduction is generally 
not large and is insignificant in all cases. Nevertheless, as Table 3 (line 2) shows, even 
small changes in the coefficient can substantially alter the magnitude of the wage 
premium, reducing it by about ten percentage points in all five countries. 
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Observable Worker Characteristics 
 
According to Becker’s (1962) theory of human capital, observed wage differences 
compensate for skills of workers, so that no worker should receive above-market wages 
given his/her skill level and experience. We therefore next investigate whether 
observable worker characteristics can explain the employer-size wage effect in the five 
African countries. The worker characteristics available to us were gender, tenure, age, 
education, and occupation. The results of including these variables in the wage 
regressions are reassuring in the sense of giving the expected and significant signs for 
most countries. Most importantly, however, when we compare these results 
(summarized in Table 2, line 3) with the prior results in Table 2, we find that the 
inclusion of observable worker characteristics substantially reduces the magnitude of the 
coefficients on firm size - in the case of Cameroon and Zambia more than halving their 
magnitudes. This finding has clear implications for the magnitude of the employer-size 
wage premium as we have measured it here, reducing it between 20 and 30 percentage 
points, as shown in Table 3 (line 3). Overall, our results suggest that observable worker 
characteristics are important determinants of the hourly wage rate, and that these 
characteristics are unevenly distributed across firm size. Specifically, large firms tend to 
hire those workers with higher levels of observable human capital. This finding is also 
consistent with what has been found in other studies for both developing and developed 
countries.    In the remainder of this paper, therefore, as we test various explanations, all 
of our regressions will include both firm and worker characteristics, and we will refer to 
this as our “base specification” of Equation (1). 
 
Unobserved Worker Skill Levels 
 
We realize, of course, that our limited number of worker control variables may not 
be adequately proxying all skill differences across workers. In other words, differences 
in  unobserved worker ability are also likely to be an important determinant of the 
employer-size wage effect. One of the earliest related theories in this regard is the 
capital-skill complementarity hypothesis of Hamermesh (1980), based on the model by 
Lucas (1978). According to this hypothesis, the most skilled managers manage the 
largest firms, both in terms of the number of workers and the size of the capital stock. If 
labour and capital are complements, then these managers will hire the most skilled 
workers and will have to pay these workers more. In order to assess this explanation, we 
therefore include the capital-labour ratio (as did Troske (1999)) in our “base regression” 
along with firm and worker characteristics. 
When we calculate the correlations of the capital-labour ratio (K/L) with firm-size, 
we find that larger firms do tend to have higher capital intensities, although the 
correlation is not very strong for any of the countries. The coefficient of this explanatory 
variable in Equation (1) with worker and firm characteristics is, however, significant 
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Table 2 (line 4), it only slightly lowers the coefficient on firm-sizes for Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, and the changes turn out to be statistically insignificant. Thus, the capital 
intensities of firms cannot account for the employer-size wage premiums observed in 
our five African countries. Similar results were also found by Troske (1999) and Reilly 
(1995) for the U.S and Canada, respectively. 
 
Average Worker Skill Levels 
 
Troske (1999) has argued that the average skill level of the workforce in a firm may 
also be important. Specifically, employers may find it more profitable to match workers 
with high skill levels with other workers with high skill levels. If there are greater fixed 
costs associated with hiring and training more skilled workers rather than less skilled 
ones, then large firms would be more likely to match together highly skilled workers.
8 
In order to determine the possible contribution of this explanation to the firm-size wage 
effect, Troske (1999) includes the average level of experience, education, and 
occupation status as explanatory variables in his wage regression. We similarly examine 
this possibility by including the proportion of the workers in a firm who have completed 
secondary and university education (% Sec and % Univ) respectively and the mean level 
of potential experience in a firm (Pexp) as proxies for the average level of skill in a firm. 
Our results show that only in Cameroon, Ghana, and Zimbabwe does the average skill 
level of the workforce, as measured by our proxies, seem to significantly raise the hourly 
wage rate of workers. However, even in these countries, these factors do not 
significantly reduce the impact of firm size on pay - as is apparent from summary Table 




Another possibility we consider is that larger employers are more likely to earn 
monopoly profits and, in order to elicit the optimum amount of effort from their 
employees, are willing to share some of these rents. Traditionally, some researchers have 
examined this possibility by including measures of market power, although these 
measures have not been found to have an effect on the employer-size wage premium.
9 
Other researchers, such as Velenchik (1997) for Zimbabwe and Troske (1999) for the 
U.S., have used value-added or profit-per-employee as measures of rents; but again these 
measures were not found to have a significant impact. Since we do not have access to 
measures of industry concentration for our five African countries, we follow the latter 
approach by using profit per employee (Profit/L) as a proxy for potential rent sharing. 
 
8 See also Kremer (1993), Kremer and Maskin (1995), and Barron et al. (1987). 
9 See, for instance, Weiss (1966), Mellow (1982), Brown and Medoff (1989), and Troske (1999) for the 
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Simple raw correlations show that this variable is indeed positively related to firm size, 
except for Kenya. However, as can be seen from Table 2 (line 6), the inclusion of this 
variable in our base specification does not appreciably alter the coefficients on firm size 
in any of the countries, even though profit per employee is a significant positive 
determinant of the wage rate in Ghana and Zambia. 
We must note several problems with this approach, however. Dipak and Mazaheri 
(1999) argue that value-added (or profit) per employee as a proxy for potential rent 
sharing is likely to be an endogenous variable in the wage equation. For if an 
individual’s wage reflects unmeasured productivity, this is likely to increase a firm’s 
labour productivity.
10 To address this problem, Dipak and Mazaheri estimate the wage 
equation and the firm’s labour productivity equation simultaneously, and are thus able to 
distinguish economies of scale and capital intensities from other (unexplained) size 
effects on wages. They find that the economies-of-scale and capital-intensity factors 
account for about 18 percent, 11 percent, and 26 percent of the single equation size 
coefficient for Ghana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, respectively, but only 1 percent for 
Kenya. Nevertheless, even for the former three countries a large size effect remains.
11  
In order to assess the possibility of endogeneity on our results, we used information from 
the more detailed Ghana data set to construct dummy variables indicating whether the 
firm is a price taker and whether the firm’s main competitors were foreign and used 
them as instruments in an instrumental  variables  estimation. However, this did not 
significantly alter the coefficient on the firm-size variable in our Profit/L specification 
for Ghana.
12 
Another potential problem is that even if a firm practices rent sharing, not all 
workers may share in the rents. Again, the more detailed Ghana data allowed us to 
examine this potential problem by providing worker-level information on whether the 
worker’s wage was a share of sales and whether the worker received a merit/production 
bonus. We constructed dummy variables for these and then interacted them with Profit/L. 
Our results (not reported here) again did not significantly alter the degree of the 




Brown and Medoff (1989) have suggested that employers who treat their employers 
well, such as by paying them relatively high wages, are more likely to grow and survive, 
and that this could also produce the employer-size wage effect. Their argument is related 
 
10 This may particularly problematic for small firms in which an individual’s unmeasured productivity is 
more likely to influence the overall labour productivity in the firm than in large firms. 
11 Moreover, it still remains larger than what has been found in comparable studies for industrialised 
countries. 
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to efficiency-wage theory in the sense that in a competitive market firms paying higher 
wages incur higher costs and will survive only if their workers are more productive. 
Calculating the raw correlations of firm age (FAge) with firm-size, we indeed find 
that these two variables are indeed positively correlated. In order to investigate whether 
this may be responsible for the firm-size wage premium in our five African countries, 
we included a firm’s age as an additional explanatory variable, although unfortunately 
information was not available to us for Zambia. However, this variable has a statistically 
significant effect on the hourly wage only for Ghana and even so is not of the expected 
sign.
13  Furthermore, in no case does the inclusion of this variable significantly alter the 
coefficient on firm-size as revealed in summary Table 2 (line 7). Our finding of no 
impact of firm age on the wage premiums paid by larger firms is in line with the findings 




There is some evidence in industrialized countries that larger firms may pay higher 
wages to avoid unionism among their workers.
14 Velenchik (1997) examines this 
possibility for Zimbabwe by including a control for whether a firm is unionized in the 
wage determination equation and finds that this reduces the magnitude of the 
employer-size wage effect between small and medium sized firms, but not for other 
parts of the wage distribution. We similarly examine the importance of union avoidance 
for our five African countries. However, rather than categorizing firms as either 
unionized or non-unionized, we use the percentage of the workforce in each firm that is 
unionized, since this measure can capture differences in union intensity among 
unionized firms. Our results show that union density in a firm does not have a significant 
impact on an individual’s wage for any of the five countries. 
Another way of measuring the effect of union avoidance is to examine the 
employer-size wage effect for unionized and non-unionized workers separately. Ceteris 
paribus, if union avoidance is an important determinant of the employer-size wage effect, 
then one should expect to find wage premiums in larger firms for non-unionized workers 
only. Unfortunately, additional data on the union status of workers are available to us 
only for the 1992 and 1993 observations for Ghana. Nevertheless, when we ran our base 
specification with worker and firm characteristics for these two samples separately using 
the Ghana data, we found that the coefficient on firm-size for the non-unionized sample 
was 0.186, while the coefficient for the unionized sample turned out to be 0.101. 
Although the larger coefficient for the non-unionized sample does suggest evidence of 
 
13 A lack of a positive correlation between firm age and wages was previously found by Brown and 
Medoff (1989) and is also consistent with the results of Troske (1999). 
14 For instance, for the U.S. Freeman and Medoff (1984) documented that the wage differential between 
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the existence of union avoidance among larger firms, the fact that unionized workers 
also enjoy large firm-size wage premiums suggests that union avoidance can at best 
explain only a small portion of this phenomenon. 
 
Manager Skill Levels 
 
Another possible explanation for the firm-size wage effect is suggested by Oi’s 
(1983) model and related to one offered earlier by Hamermesh (1980). In Oi’s model the 
most skilled managers work in the largest firms but must divide their time between 
monitoring workers and managing the firm. The model assumes that the more skilled 
managers are better at managing the firm than they are at monitoring workers, while the 
more skilled workers require less monitoring. Hence, one would expect that the more 
skilled managers hire the more skilled workers, with a resulting firm-size wage premium 
observed if the skill level of managers is not controlled for. 
As in Troske (1999), we thus included in our base specification of equation 1 proxies 
for managerial ability in regressions for non-managerial worker samples. Specifically, 
we controlled for the proportion of managers in the firm whose highest level of 
education was secondary (Mansec) and for the proportion of managers whose highest 
level of education was at the university level (Manuniv).
15 However, our measures of 
managerial ability seem to have a significant positive impact on wages only in 
Cameroon and Ghana. 
To assess whether the inclusion of managerial ability controls has had an impact on 
the employer-size wage effect, we also estimated our base equation for the non- 
managerial worker subgroup with only the worker and firm level characteristics. As can 
be seen from Table 2 (lines 9 and 10), the coefficients on the firm-size variable are 
substantially smaller relative to those of the unrestricted samples for all five countries 
and imply a wage premium for working in a large firm that ranges between 19 and 35 
percent for this subgroup in Africa. In contrast, Troske (1999) finds no relationship 
between wages and managerial ability, and concludes that the latter does not alter the 




Firms may also pay higher wages to workers to entice them not to shirk on the job. If 
the cost of shirking is more expensive in larger firms or the cost of monitoring is higher 
in larger firms, then one should expect larger firms to pay higher wages - in this context 
known as efficiency wages - and engage in less monitoring than smaller firms.
16 If  this 
 
15 We consider both managers and supervisors as part of the managerial category. 
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is the case for our five African countries, then controlling for monitoring might be able 
to account for some of the employer-size wage effect. 
Using information on the distribution of workers by occupational group, we 
calculated the ratio of supervisors and managers (Supvis) relative to the total workforce 
for each firm. The raw correlation of this with firm-size is indeed negative for all 
countries except Ghana. However, the inclusion of this variable in our base specification 
of Equation (1) for our sample of non-managerial workers does not significantly alter the 
firm-size coefficient, as reported in line 11 of Table 2. Our results may not be surprising, 
though. Velenchik (1997) argues that, since the threat of dismissal is integral to the 
shirking argument and because of the difficulty in dismissing permanent workers in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the efficiency wage argument outlined above is not likely to have 
had an effect on the firm-size wage distribution. In Zimbabwe, for example, employers 
maintain a stock of casual workers under fixed (but often renewed) term contracts, and 
statistics show that the proportion of these workers in the workforce rises with 
employment size. One should also note that Troske (1999) in his study of the U.S. used a 
proxy for monitoring intensity that turned out to be significant and of the expected sign; 
however, its inclusion did not significantly alter the employer-size wage premium. And 
in their simultaneous equations model of the firm-size wage effect, Mazumdar and 
Mazaheri (1999) also used the wage premium (calculated as the residual wage from an 
earnings regression much like our Equation (1)) as a proxy for efficiency wages. They 





As noted by Oi and Idson (1999), worker turnover rates tend to be inversely related 
to firm-size. One possible reason for this is that large firms provide more on the job 
training and/or that hiring is more expensive for larger firms in general. Given these 
larger overhead costs, it may thus be in the interest of larger firms to reduce labour 
turnover relatively more by offering higher wages. Using data that is solely available for 
Ghana for worker turnover, we calculated the degree of excess turnover - i.e., worker 
turnover in excess of net employment changes - for each firm over the three years in 
order to include it in our wage equation.
18 Given that excess turnover may be to some 
 
17 One possibility is that our results are biased given that one could argue that the rate of monitoring is 
simultaneously determined with wages as firms are likely to choose both the wages they offer and the degree 
of monitoring at the same time. For Ghana, for which we have more detailed data, there is information on 
whether the firm is affected by legislative restrictions on hiring, firing, and layoffs; and we thus used a 
zero-one type variable indicating whether firms were subject to such restrictions as an instrument for 
monitoring under an instrumental variables estimation. This did not significantly alter the coefficient on 
employment size. 
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extent simultaneously determined as firms set wages according to desired turnover rates, 
we instrumented this variable with a dummy indicating whether the firm was subject to 
hiring and firing restrictions. The subsequent coefficient on our excess turnover rate 
variable turned out to be, contrary to expectations, positive and significant, and did not 
significantly alter the size of the employer coefficient (0.133), indicating that higher 
wages in larger firms are not likely to be significantly associated with reducing costs 





As with the union avoidance argument, one could argue (see Brown and Medoff 
(1989)) that larger firms may pay higher wages in order to avoid paying benefits to their 
workers. Using our detailed data set for Ghana, we were able to derive information on 
whether firms provided health care benefits for their workers and/or their families, as 
well as overtime pay, paid leave, paid public holidays, and pension funds. We then 
included a set of dummies indicating the provision of these benefits in the regression for 
Ghana. The sample for which there are complete observations on these benefit dummies 
produced a firm-size coefficient of 0.105. Including the set of dummy variables reduced 
this coefficient to 0.086, suggesting a small but insignificant reduction in the employer- 
size wage effect. Moreover, those dummy variables that were significant, namely the 
provision of health care benefits and overtime pay, had a positive effect on wages, 
suggesting that higher paid jobs are more likely to provide these benefits. 
 
Still Other Explanations 
 
Of course our data do not allow us to examine all the possible explanations for the 
employer-size wage effect that have been put forth and examined in the literature thus 
far. Among those explanations that we do not have sufficient data to address are those 
suggesting that differences in working conditions, the importance of filling vacancies, 
and differences in job-specific training across firm size are responsible. However, it 
must be noted that those prior studies in which data did allow these aspects to be 
examined were unable to explain very much of the employer-size wage effect.
20 
We also have not addressed institutional explanations, other than union avoidance, 
that may be able to explain the wage premium. For example, minimum wage legislation 
could conceivably affect the premium if compliance differs across firm sizes. However, 
Velenchik (1997), Schaffner (1998), and Marcelle and Strobl (2003) have argued that 
 
19 We also experimented with including a dummy for whether the worker received on the job training, but 
this variable was not significant and did not alter the employer size coefficient. 
20 For a study of the impact of working conditions, see, for instance, Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991). 
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minimum wage legislation seems to have had little impact on the firm-size wage effect 
in Zimbabwe, Peru, or Trinidad and Tobago, respectively. Moreover, in their comparative 
study of four Nordic countries with the U.S., Albaek et al. (1996) show that, despite 
large differences in the institutional arrangements of the Nordic and U.S. labour 
markets,
21 the magnitudes of the employer-size wage effect were fairly similar. They 
therefore conclude that labour market institutions are unlikely to be responsible for this 
wage premium. 
There are also other methods that take account of such problems as sample selection 
bias or unobserved factors that are correlated with employer size that we were unable to 
implement. More specifically, models like the adverse selection model of the efficiency 
wage theory (see Blinder and Choi (1990)) argue that if workers differ in their 
productivity, if at least some of these productivity differences are unobservable, and if 
unobservable productivity differences are correlated with outside wage offers, then firms 
offering lower wages will attract an inferior applicant pool. And if it is more important 
for larger firms to avoid inferior workers because of, for example, their lower 
complementarity with better capital, then larger firms may pay higher wages to reduce 
the probability of hiring inferior workers. To correct for this sample selection bias, 
however, would require the separate estimation of a selection equation with the 
appropriate exclusion criteria, a notoriously difficulty task with the data sets normally at 
hand, including the current one. Moreover, as the review of the literature by Oi and 
Idson (1999) demonstrates, these methods have not been able to solve the puzzle of the 
firm-size wage premium in the U.S.; and studies by Schaffner (1998) and Marcelle and 
Strobl (2003) have arrived at similar conclusions for developing countries. 
 
 
5.    COMPARISON WITH OTHER DEVELOPING   
AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
Our results thus far suggest not only that existing theories are unable to empirically 
account for much of the wage premium associated with larger employers, but also that 
the effect does not differ greatly across our f i v e  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s .  E v e n  w h e n  w e  
include all our significant control variables for each country, as shown in summary 
Table 2 (line 12), the coefficients remain largely unchanged relative to our base 
specification (line 3) and also fairly similar across countries. As a matter of fact, simple 
t-tests reveal that the coefficients do not differ significantly between any of the countries. 
This being the case,  we thus now proceed to compare our results to those of other 
developing nations and the industrialized world. 
 
 
21 For example, markets in the Nordic countries are more regulated and union density is higher. DO LARGE EMPLOYERS PAY MORE?  153
Comparison with Other Developing Countries 
 
Direct comparisons of the employer-size wage effect for countries within the 
developing world are difficult, given both their paucity and the range of data and the 
employer-size variables used. Using our African data set, we constructed firm-size 
dummies similar to those used in Schaffner (1998) for Peru, and in Table 4 we display 
the coefficients of these using firm and worker characteristics in conjunction with 
Schaffner’s results. It must be kept in mind, however, that the African data is for 
manufacturing only and is limited to formal sector employees. Moreover, the choice of 
firm-size dummies is in a sense a bit arbitrary, and a different set could conceivably 
result in different conclusions. Furthermore, an argument could also be made that the 
different size distributions of firms across countries should also be controlled for when 
selecting the firm size categories; however, we were unable to do so. 
 
 
Table 4.    Comparison of Employer-Size Wage Effects of U.S.   
and Peru with African Countries 
Firm Size  Peru  Cameroon Ghana  Kenya  Zambia Zimbabwe  U.S. 
6-20 0.291






















Notes: The firm-size results for Peru and the U.S. are from Schaffner (1998). The + sign indicates statistical 
significance but the levels of significance for results in the Schaffner study were not specified. In this Table 
and in Table 5, ***, **, and * denote one, five, and ten percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 4, relative to micro firms (5 or fewer employees) small firms 
(6-20 employees) pay significantly higher wages only in Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, 
although this may be because of the lack of coverage of the informal sector in the 
African data sets. We also find that the medium-sized-firm (21-200 employees) wage 
effect, again relative to micro firms, is noticeably higher in Ghana and Zimbabwe. 
Compared to Peru, the largest firms (201+ employees) in Cameroon, Ghana, and 
Zimbabwe pay higher wages relative to micro level firms, while in the remaining two 
African countries the differentials are roughly similar. Perhaps the most striking 
observation in Table 4, however, is that the firm-size wage effect in Zimbabwe is always 
considerably greater than in Peru. This occurs despite our not including the informal 
sector, which one would expect to magnify the employer-size wage effect even further.
22 
We also had access to data used in Marcelle and Strobl (2003) for Trinidad and 
Tobago, and with this data we constructed comparable estimates for the employer-size 
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wage effect for firms with at least ten employees.
23  Accordingly, the coefficient on this 
zero-one type employer size variable for Trinidad and Tobago (0.469) was larger than 
those for Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia (0.191, 0.314, 0.249, and 0.112, 
respectively) but was smaller than that of Zimbabwe, (0.618). One should note, however, 
that, as in the case for the Peruvian data, the Trinidad and Tobago data also include 
informal sector employees. Hence one would expect the coefficients for the African 
countries to underestimate the true firm-size wage effect. 
 
Comparisons with Developed Countries 
 
Although the number of studies of developing countries is small compared to those 
done for the developed world, they thus far strongly indicate that the employer-size 
wage effect is substantially larger in the developing world. For instance, in her 
previously mentioned study of Peru, Schaffner (1998) constructs a firm-size variable 
similar to ones that have been constructed for the U.S. and finds the wage effect to be 
much larger in Peru than in the U.S., particularly for workers employed in very small 
establishments. These results are also given in Table 4. As the table further shows, the 
employer-size wage effect appears to higher in the African countries than in the U.S., 
particularly for larger firm-size categories. Again it must be pointed out that the 
exclusion of the informal sector is likely to underestimate the firm-size wage effect for 
our five African nations.
24 Similar studies also suggest that in relative terms the 
employer-size wage effect is large in developing country labour markets; see, for 
instance, Little et al. (1987) for evidence for Bombay and Malaysia. 
In their study of Nordic countries, Albaek et al. (1998) use (as we have here) a 
continuous measure of firm size which allows for a direct comparison with our results, 
except for the fact their data set covers the entire labour market in each country rather 
than just the manufacturing sector. Using worker characteristics
25 and industry and 
regional dummies, they find the coefficients on firm size to be 0.025, 0.020, 0.025, and 
0.021 for Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, respectively. These coefficients are, 
of course, considerably smaller than those for our five African countries. The study that 
is probably the most directly comparable to the one undertaken here, however, is that of 
Troske (1999), who also uses an employer-employee matched data set and a continuous 
 
23 This choice of firm-size categories was due to data restrictions in the Trinidad and Tobago data set. We 
furthermore reduced the Trinidad and Tobago sample to employees in the manufacturing sector and only 
included control variables that were common to both data sets. Detailed results are available from the authors. 
24 For instance, when we compare the Peruvian data, which include informal sector employees, there is 
clearly a large effect. However, this effect does not seem to increase as one moves to larger firm-size 
categories. 
25  The worker characteristics are schooling, experience, experience squared, seniority, gender and 
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measure of firm size for the U.S. manufacturing sector. In his base specification with 
worker and firm control variables, he finds the coefficient on firm size to be 0.033. 
Again, his employer-size wage effect is considerably smaller than the ones we find here 
for our African countries. 
One finding by Troske, documented earlier by Brown and Medoff (1989), suggests 
why the employer-size wage effect is larger in developing countries. Troske found that 
in the U.S. the employer-size wage effect is slightly smaller for white collar workers 
than for blue collar workers. For instance, for white collar workers (excluding managers) 
he finds a coefficient on the firm size variable of 0.021 compared to 0.032 for blue collar 
workers.
26 In an earlier study, Doms et al. (1997) noticed that firm size had the same 
impact across skill categories, whereas Oi and Idson (1999) found a decreasing effect 
with rising skill level. (Both studies were done for the U.S.) Although this question has 
not been examined for other developed nations, given that the employer-size effect does 
not appear to differ dramatically we suspect that a similar pattern - the same or only a 
slightly smaller firm-size wage effect for higher skill levels and white collar workers - 
would be found in other developed nations as well. In contrast, for those developing 
country studies which have estimated the employer-size wage effect separately for white 
and blue collar workers (namely Mazumdar (1983) for Bombay, Mazumdar (1981) for 
Malaysia, as well as Schaffner (1998) and Marcelle and Strobl (2003)), white collar 
workers have been found to be subject to a larger effect. Also, using RPED data 
Mazumdar (1994) noticed a similar trend for Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Cameroon. 
For completeness sake, we have therefore similarly divided the data for our five African 
countries into blue-collar and white-collar sub-groups and estimated the firm-size wage 
effect for each group, as shown in Table 2, lines 13 and 14. As can be seen, Ghana 
exhibits the same pattern as the other four African countries; in all cases the coefficient 
is higher for white collar workers.
27 As did Troske (1999), we also estimated the 
firm-size wage effect separately for those white collar workers who are supervisors and 
managers and found the effect for this group to be higher than for the remaining white 
collar workers.
28  In contrast, Troske finds the effect to be even smaller for this group. 
Velenchik (1995), who similarly found a larger effect for her earlier study of 
Zimbabwe using the same data source, suggests a number of possible reasons. First, if 
unfilled positions are more costly in larger firms because they have higher stocks of 
potentially idle capital and if the labour market for white collars is relatively more tight, 
then the firm-size wage premium would be higher for white collar workers. A similar 
effect would be expected if the acquisition of firm-specific human capital is more 
 
26 The coefficient on a sample of managers only was 0.004. 
27 We also used total worker samples and included a white collar dummy variable and an interaction term 
of this and firm size. In all cases the interaction term was positive and significant, except in the case of Ghana 
were it was marginally insignificant. 
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important for white collar workers in general, but specifically in larger firms. On the 
other hand, although both of these explanations seem plausible, it is still not clear why 
this effect should be less important in developed countries like the U.S. Velenchik 
(1995) also suggests that the difference across these two broad occupational groups 
could be due to the fact that monitoring costs are higher for white collar workers. But, 
again, there appears to be little reason why this should be different in the developed 
world. 
Perhaps the most promising explanation for the occupational difference in the 
firm-size wage effect derives from results found by Tan and Batra (1997), who examine 
the impact of technology on the firm-size wage effect for skilled and unskilled workers 
in Colombia, Mexico and Taiwan. They find that the wage effect is higher for skilled 
workers than for unskilled workers only in technology-investing firms. They argue that 
the likely explanation is that technological change is skill-biased and that larger firms 
are more likely to be technology-intensive. This could very well account for the broad 
occupational differences in the employer-size wage effect in developing countries 
relative to that found for the U.S. if larger firms in the U.S. are not more likely to be 
technology-intensive and/or if technological change in the U.S. is not skill biased. 
However, indirect empirical evidence does not provide strong support for either of these 
two possibilities. For example, with regard to technological intensity, Dunne and 
Schmitz (1995) find that in the U.S. larger firms are in fact more likely to use advanced 
technology. In terms of skill-biased technological change, Katz and Murphy (1992) and 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) discover that skill-biased technological change has played 
a major role in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. On the other 
hand, Troske (1999) finds that the inclusion of total new investment in computers as a 
control variable does not significantly alter the employer-size wage effect, although he 
does not carry out this particular exercise separately for white collar and blue collar 
workers. More plausibly, it may be that the difference in technology use across firm size 
is not that large in the industrialized world. Also, it may be that at higher absolute levels 
of technology, such a white collar effect is simply not important. 
In order to determine whether a similar explanation is likely for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
we classified employers in Ghana (the only one of the five countries for which these data 
were available) into technology-intensive and non-technology-intensive firms. 
Specifically, we classified firms as technology-intensive if they were actively 
conducting R&D, were foreign firms or exporters, or had invested in new capital 
equipment in the last three years.
29 We found that technology-intensive firms had an 
average of 64 employees, while the non-technology-intensive firms had an average of 
only 28 employees, clear evidence for the assertion that larger firms are more 
technology intensive. Using this classification we then ran separate regressions for these 
 
29 Batra and Tan (1997) classified firms as technology-intensive if they exported, conducted R&D, or 
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groups on the determinants of the hourly wage rate using the remaining firm and worker 
characteristics while also including a white collar dummy (WhiteC) and its interaction 
with firm size. The results of this exercise are given in Table 5. As can be seen, the 
coefficient of the white collar dummy variable and its interaction with firm size is 
insignificant for the non-intensive sample. The coefficient on the firm size variable, 
0.267, is significant, however, and considerably larger than what was found for the 
overall sample. In contrast, for employees working in technology-intensive firms, the 
coefficient on the employer-size wage effect (.053) is far smaller. Moreover, the 
coefficient on the interaction term of the white-collar-worker dummy with employment 
(0.063) is significant, and suggests that the “white collar worker effect” is more than 
double the firm-size wage effect in technology-intensive firms. The results of this 
exercise thus indicate that differences in the employer-size wage effect between blue and 
white collar workers may exist only in firms that are technology intensive, thus 
providing support for a skill-biased technical change explanation of occupational 
differences. Moreover, given the relative total employer-size wage effect across these 
two groups of firms, our results suggest that much of the large employer-size wage 
effect in developing countries may be due to the wage structure of low technology firms. 
 
 
Table 5.    Technology Intensity and the “White Collar Effect” 
 Intensive  Non-Intensive 
Log Size  0.053
* 0.267
*** 
 (0.029)  (0.078) 
WhiteC 0.104  0.000 
 (0.160)  (0.000) 
WhiteC*(Log Size)  0.063
* 0.040 




 (0.261)  (0.434) 
Observations 1129  328 
F-Test 40.17  258.91 
R-squared 0.49  0.49 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have examined the wage premium associated with working in large 
firms for five African countries. Specifically, we have evaluated a large number of 
theoretical explanations that have been put forth to explain this phenomenon by taking 
advantage of a rich employer-employee matched data set which allows for comparability 
across countries. As in virtually all previous studies for developed countries, few of our 
explanations can account for a substantial proportion of the employer-size wage ERIC STROBL AND ROBERT THORNTON  158
premium. The notable exception is that of observable worker characteristics, which 
suggests that workers with higher amounts of human capital tend to work in larger firms. 
Nevertheless, a large portion of the wage premium remains unexplained. 
Interestingly, we have found that the unexplained portion of the employer-size wage 
effect is not significantly different across the five African countries studied, so that 
differences in the actual premium are due to differences in the firm size distribution. A 
similar lack of differences in the employer-size wage effect has also been found in the 
industrialized world, even among countries with markedly different labour market 
institutions, although with less comparable data. However, comparisons of the 
developed world to the developing world have consistently shown that the effect is 
noticeably larger in the latter, and our study lends further support to this finding. 
There is one additional striking finding unearthed in our study that may go some way 
towards explaining the differences across levels of development. Unlike what has been 
observed for industrialized nations, we have found that the employer-size wage premium 
is higher for white collar and skilled workers than for blue collar workers. Evidence 
from one of the countries (Ghana) for which richer data were available, in conjunction 
with results from other studies, suggests that this may reflect the fact that larger firms 
are more likely to embody new technologies and that the technical change associated 
with this is skill-biased. As to why a similar trend is not apparent in developed nations, 
or at least not in the U.S., there are a number of possible reasons. There may be a wider 
dispersion of technology in developing countries, or at lower levels of technology this 
effect may be more important. Or it may be the case that skill-biased technical change 
has not been much different across firm sizes in the industrialized world. As even richer 







Hourly Wage Rate (Log)  Logged value of hourly wage rate converted to PPP $US 
Size (Log)  Logged value of employment in firm 
Foreign  Dummy for any foreign ownership 
CapCity  Dummy for location in capital city 
Wood  Dummy for operating in the Wood & Furniture Sector 
Metal  Dummy for operating in the Metals Sector 
Textile  Dummy for operating in the Textile Sector 
Male  Dummy for males 
Age Age 
Age
2  Squared value of age 
Tenure  Tenure in firm 




2  Squared value of tenure 
Primary  Dummy for highest level of education is primary 
Secondary  Dummy for highest level of education is secondary 
University  Dummy for highest level of education is university 
Mgmt  Dummy for managers 
Admin  Dummy for administrators 
Sales  Dummy for sales persons 
Super  Dummy for supervisors 
Tech  Dummy for technicians 
%Sec  Weighted average of workers whose highest level of 
education is secondary   
%Univ  Weighted average of workers whose highest level of 
education is university 
Pexp  Weighted average of potential experience 
K/L  Value of capital stock per employee in PPP $US 
Profit/L  Profits per employee in PPP $US 
FAge  Age of Firm 
Union  Percentage of workforce unionised 
ManSec  Weighted average of managers with highest level of 
education is secondary 
ManUniv  Weighted average of managers with highest level of 
education is university 
Supvis  Ratio of supervisors and managers to the total workforce 
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